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      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3712 
_____________ 
 
 
SHAO CHEN,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                                                                    Respondent 
        
            
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No.:  A073-187-116) 
Immigration Judge: Donald V. Ferlise 
      
 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, MCKEE and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 22, 2017)        
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___________ 
 
  O P I N I O N* 
___________        
                      
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 Shao He Chen, a Chinese native and citizen, was denied asylum in 1997. 
Thereafter, he remained in the United States and fathered three children. When he 
recently moved to reopen his immigration proceedings, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“Board”) denied the motion. Chen appeals that ruling. Before the Board, Chen 
urged that because China enforces its family planning policy more aggressively today 
than it did when he originally applied for asylum in the 1990s, he would face persecution 
upon return to China for exceeding that country’s birth quotas. Because the Board did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen, we will uphold its ruling. 
 The Board will only grant a motion to reopen a case if (1) “the evidence sought to 
be offered is material, was not available, and could not have been discovered or presented 
at the time of the original hearing,” and (2) “prima facie eligibility for . . . relief has been 
established.” INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 97–98 (1988) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  
 We review the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Filja 
v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 258 (3d Cir. 2006).1  In conducting our review, we uphold the 
decision unless it was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” See Jian Jian Guo v. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  
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Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Factual determinations are upheld if “supported by reasonable, substantial and 
probative evidence.” See id. (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).  
 Here, Chen has not borne the “heavy burden” required for the Board to reopen his 
case. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110. The Board found that Chen did not demonstrate 
materially changed conditions with respect to family planning enforcement in China 
between 1997, when Chen last appeared before an immigration judge, and 2015, when he 
filed his motion to reopen. The Board issued a reasoned opinion after reviewing all of the 
evidence, and did not abuse its discretion. 
 Nevertheless, Chen raises several—often scattered—arguments as to why we 
should set aside the Board’s ruling. We address each in turn. First, Chen claims that the 
Board erred in taking administrative notice of the State Department’s 2015 Country 
Report on Human Rights Conditions in China without providing him the ability to 
respond. Chen urges that this violates his due process rights. We disagree. The Board 
may take administrative notice of “the contents of official documents such as country 
condition reports prepared by the Department of State,” see Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 
F.3d 584, 591–92 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural 
Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54878, 54891 (Aug. 26, 2002)), all 
the more so here because Chen himself put the earlier state department reports at issue. 
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The BIA can hardly be faulted for considering a more current version of the same kind of 
evidence that Chen presented.2 
 Second, Chen argues that the Board relied on the 2015 China Country Report to 
make an improper assumption about the effect of China’s family planning enforcement 
policy. The exact nature of this argument is unclear, but Chen appears to misunderstand 
the Board’s reasoning. The Board did not, as Chen suggests, rely on the report to 
conclude that he has not violated China’s family planning policy. Rather, the Board relied 
on the report to conclude that conditions in China with respect to family planning 
enforcement had not materially worsened since 1997. See AR 6.  
 Third, Chen faults the Board for the “limited weight” it gave to unsworn 
statements of individuals with foreign-born children who claimed they were persecuted 
after returning to Chen’s native province from abroad.  Chen asserts that discounting 
these unsworn statements was arbitrary and irrational, for three reasons.  First, he takes 
issue with the Board for discounting the statements because they were unsworn and not 
subject to cross examination. He points out that none of the evidence he provided was 
“sworn to or available to cross-examination,” Br. at 19, other than Chen’s own statement, 
and queries why the personal statements were subject to differential treatment by the 
Board. The answer is clear: none of the other documents, except Chen’s own testimony, 
                                              
2 Chen’s reliance on Chhetry v. Dep’t of Justice, 490 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2007) is 
unavailing. That case observed that some circuits require an opportunity to respond 
where the Board’s reliance on the administratively noticed facts is dispositive. Id. at 200. 
Here, the Board’s decision was not based solely (or even primarily) upon the Country 
report.  
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was a personal statement. See generally AR 122–1328. Thus, the other documents, 
including news articles, reports, and a sworn expert opinion, do not present the same 
reliability concerns as personal statements that were essentially hearsay. As such, the 
Board rationally concluded that unsworn personal statements were entitled to less weight 
than other evidence. See Fei Yan Zhu v. Att’y General U.S., 744 F.3d 268, 275 (3d Cir. 
2014) (Board may give evidence “whatever weight it deems appropriate . . . in light of all 
the other evidence presented”). 
 Next, Chen claims that the Board improperly relied on its adverse credibility 
finding at Chen’s deportation hearing in the 1990’s to contextualize the evidentiary value 
of the unsworn statements. The Board believed the personal statements were of 
“essentially unknown reliability, and given [Chen’s] previous lack of candor in his 
deportation proceedings,” they were of limited evidentiary worth. AR 5. We find no error 
in the Board’s contextualization of the evidence. The Board was free to view the 
evidence in the record as a whole, and—as Chen himself notes—was obligated to do so. 
Br. at 20-21. 
 Relatedly, Chen proceeds to argue that the Board erred in assessing the value 
evidence individually, instead of as a whole. Br. at 20; see Huang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010). Chen misinterprets the Board’s analysis. When the 
Board said that some individual evidence was not “of sufficient evidentiary worth to 
support reopening [Chen’s] proceedings,” AR 5, it was not analyzing each piece of 
Case: 16-3712     Document: 003112656794     Page: 5      Date Filed: 06/22/2017
6 
 
evidence individually in a vacuum. Rather, it looked at the evidence as a whole and 
concluded that there was no reason to reopen Chen’s case.3  
 Chen further avers that the Board did not give sufficient weight to documents 
submitted by aliens from Chen’s native province in China. Here, Chen fails to present a 
cognizable argument.4 He simply rejects as “utterly irrational,” Br. at 23, the Board’s 
finding that the cases he offered into evidence were dissimilar from his own. Chen does 
so without saying exactly how the Board erred.  While he clearly disagrees with the 
Board, Chen has done nothing to convince us that the Board erred.5   
                                              
3 Throughout his brief, Chen takes individual words or phrases from the Board’s opinion 
out of context and classifies them as legal error. Especially given our deferential standard 
of review, we decline to read legal error into the Board’s decision.  
4 Chen seems to suggest (1) that we should read Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 
(B.I.A. 2007) to establish Board policy for how it weighs evidence, and (2) that the Board 
violated its policy by prioritizing evidence from the Petitioner’s native county. Br. at 22. 
In J-H-S, the Board found that Petitioners could demonstrate eligibility for asylum if, 
among other things, they provide evidence that the births of their children “violated 
family planning polices in that alien’s local province, municipality, or other locally-
defined area.” Id. at 197–98 (emphasis added). Perplexingly, Chen seems to argue that 
the use of the disjunctive “or” means that the Board must give evidence from anywhere 
in Chen’s entire native province the same weight as evidence from his home county. Br. 
at 22–23. 
 Even setting aside that the phrase “locally-defined area” is ambiguous, Chen’s 
argument fails. He excises the allegedly supportive language from a broader passage of J-
H-S- that in fact emphasizes the fluidity of the Board’s evidentiary assessment: an alien 
“may qualify as a refugee if the evidence presented establishes, on a case-by-case basis, 
that births violated family planning policies . . . and that current local family planning 
enforcement efforts would give rise a well-founded fear of persecution because of the 
violation.” Id. at 197–98 (emphases added). J-H-S- clearly contemplated an 
individualized inquiry into many factors of an alien’s case, beyond simple geography. 
The Board remained faithful to that precedent in evaluating Chen’s motion. 
5 Even if the Board had taken all the personal statements at issue as true, they represented 
only “isolated instances of serious harm,” AR 5, rather than materially changed 
circumstances. 
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 Finally, Chen argues that the Board failed to “meaningfully consider” CECC 
reports and local enforcement campaigns. He claims the Board’s treatment was 
“inadequate and merely cursory.” Br. at 25. But as Chen acknowledges, the Board need 
not address every piece of evidence in the record.  See Huang, 620 F.3d at 388. He does 
not cite with specificity evidence that the Board ignored or that would conclusively 
support his claims that conditions materially worsened, and our review does not reveal 
any evidence indicating that the Board’s conclusion was incorrect or improper. Unlike 
cases where we have taken issue with the Board’s analysis, see Huang, 620 F.3d at 388, 
the Board here conducted a plenary review of the evidence in the record.6   
 Because Chen has not demonstrated changed country conditions such that his case 
warranted reopening, we need not consider his prima facie eligibility for the relief 
sought. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 97–98. And because the Board did not abuse its 
discretion, we will uphold its ruling. 
                                              
6 This case is not like Zhu, 744 F.3d at 268. There, we were concerned with the Board’s 
“perfunctory” treatment of evidence, id. at 278 (citation omitted), and that the Board did 
not “meaningfully address” evidence such that cogent review was possible, id. at 279. 
Here, the Board cited significant evidence of longstanding family planning policies in 
Chen’s native Fujian Province. AR 6. Chen presented the Board with a voluminous 
record, but he is unable to cite specific probative evidence that the Board ignored. 
Accordingly, we find no difficulty in this case in “perceiv[ing] that [the Board] has heard 
and thought and not merely reacted.” Zhu, 744 F.3d at 278 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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